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  
Abstract— Security provisioning is an essential part in the 
design of any communication systems, which becomes more 
critical for wireless systems. The consideration and comparisons 
of security algorithms in various Open Systems Interconnection 
(OSI) layers is a difficult task, since there are many performance 
metrics involved. The aim of this novel research article is to 
present research results for the design of a wireless system 
revolving around the practical and low-cost implementation of 
Suite-B algorithms in different layers. Suite B, promulgated by 
the National Security Agency (NSA), is a set of cryptographic 
algorithms, including non-repudiation. The end results include 
the deployment of Suite-B algorithms at the application-, 
transport-, and network-layers and the protocol flow at each 
layer.  
 
Index Terms—Suite-B, non-repudiation, multilayer, cross-
layer, security, application layer, transport layer, network layer.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
HIS article  features a systematic and novel approach to 
non-repudiation offered at three layers: application-, 
transport, and network-layers. A non-repudiation system often 
involves a transparent mechanism through which, no party 
involved in the communication can deny having participated 
in the whole or a part of the communication sessions. 
Therefore security is one of the key points being considered in 
this article. Another important issue is the Quality of Service 
(QoS) provisioning, which is out of the scope of this paper. 
This article covers a number of key contributions, such as:  
Application Layer Suite-B – The National Security Agency 
(NSA)’s Suite B is formalized in CNSSP-15 in March 2010, 
which is used for classified and non-classified data exchange 
[1]. In this article, application layer Suite-B algorithms are 
analyzed in detail. 
Transport Layer Suite-B – Suite-B algorithms deployment 
at the transport layer is also considered and discussed. 
Network Layer Suite-B – The deployments of Suite B 
algorithms at the network layer are considered as well. 
Layer Security Protocols – The design of novel security 
protocols at these three layers are also included in this article. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section II covers 
the background. Section III discusses the security model and 
protocol at the application layer. Sections IV and V cover 
transport layer and network layer security models/protocols. 
Section VI presents the security analysis of the multilayer 
system followed by the conclusion and references. 
 
. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The non-repudiation system under consideration, involves at 
least two communication parties; namely Party A and Party B. 
The security aspect of a Point-to-Point (P2P) link involves the 
associated security mechanisms and protocol protecting the 
end-points and the flow between them. 
In terms of novel research contributions of this article, a 
thorough research on layered and cross-layer security schemes 
with a special focus on the application layer.  
The security schemes considered at three layers 
(application, transport, and network) are based on Suite-B 
cryptographic algorithms [1]. NSA initiated three efforts to 
address widespread cryptographic interoperability and security 
issues, one of which is; Cryptographic Interoperability 
Strategy (CIS) in which, Suite-B algorithms are one of CIS’s 
core to protect both classified and unclassified information. 
An end-to-end security mechanism may include the 
deployment of Suite-B cryptographic algorithms, including: 
the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) for the key 
agreement, the Advanced Encryption Standard - 
Galois/Counter Mode (AES-GCM) for the encryption-
authentication, Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
(ECDSA) for the digital signatures, and the Secure Hash 
Algorithm (SHA) for message digest and integrity schemes. 
Suite-B uses Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) exclusively 
for key exchange and digital signature. 
The non-repudiation aspect described in this article is based 
on the Suite-B’s digital signature scheme; ECDSA. The digital 
signature and the hashing function target the entire payload of 
the traffic and the challenge is to offer such extensive security 
treatment in the presence of QoS-ready schemes. 
A. Wireless Security Requirements 
Security mechanisms are a set of functions and algorithms, 
which provide the capability to support: confidentiality, 
privacy, integrity, non-repudiation (accountability), 
availability, authenticity, authorization, and access control, 
for the legitimate users and/or the information transmitted 
between one another.  Reference [2] covers a detailed 
introduction about these security functions and mechanisms. 
However, non-repudiability is discussed in more details here. 
1) Non-Repudiation 
A non-repudiation mechanism is the ability to prevent an 
authorized user from denying its involvement in a previous 
communication or activity. Non-repudiation techniques may 
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 use hashing and digital signature schemes, which are 
introduced in the following subsections.  
-- Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA): SHA is a family of hash 
algorithms based on Federal Information Processing Standard 
(FIPS) and published by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST). The most recent SHA operational 
family member is SHA-2 (SHA-3 was selected by NIST as the 
next member of the SHA family and the official draft is 
expected in 2014 Q 2) [3]. 
-- Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA): A 
digital signature is a mathematical expression intended to 
provide integrity and authenticity of the message and the 
person generating it. The generator of the message creates the 
digital signature and attaches it to the ongoing transmissions, 
which enables the recipient to correctly identify the real 
originator of the transmission and ensures that the message 
hasn’t been altered by an illegitimate user.  
The ECDSA is the elliptic curve-based version of the DSA 
scheme. It has been accepted in NIST and IEEE standards 
since 2000 [4]. The Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 
utilizes the arithmetic operations and calculations of points, 
which are coordinates of an elliptic curve equation solutions 
defined over a finite field. The ECDSA algorithms have been 
explained in the following steps [4]: 
ECDSA Key Generation Algorithm: Alice follows the 
following steps: 
1. Select a random integer number of d, which is a member 
of the set: [2, n – 2]. 
2. Calculate Q = P x d.  
3. Alice’s private and public keys are: d and (E, P, n, Q) 
-- ECDSA Signature Generation Algorithm: Alice signs the 
message m through the following algorithm: 
1. Select a random integer number of k, which is a member 
of the set: [2, n – 2]. 
2. Calculate k x P = (x1, y1), a point on the elliptic curve, and 
r = x1 mod n. Assuming x1 is a binary number 
representation if x1 GF (2
k
). If r = 0, then go to Step 1. 
3. Calculate k-1 mod n. 
4. Calculate s = k-1 (d.r + H (m)) mod n, where H (m) is the 
SHA value of m. If s = 0, then go to Step 1. 
5. (r, s) pair is the message m’s signature. 
 
ECDSA Signature Verification Algorithm: Bob verifies 
Alice’s signature, message pair (r, s, m), through the following 
algorithm: 
1. Calculate f = s-1 mod n and H (m). 
2. Calculate g1 = H (m) . f mod n and g2 = r . f mod n. 
3. Calculate P x g1 + Q x g2 = (x1, y1) and v = x0 mod n. 
4. If v = r, the signature (r, s, m) is accepted and verified. 
III. SECURITY MODEL AT THE APPLICATION LAYER 
A system’s security model is based on two security 
subsystems: Security algorithms and security protocol. These 
two security subsystems are introduced in this subsection. 
A. Security Algorithms  
The security model of this system, as mentioned, is built 
around cross-layer Suite-B cryptographic-based non-
repudiation system in a P2P scenario between party A (e.g., 
doctor) and party B (e.g., patient or medical storage device). 
Party B is capable of decoding the signatures and linking the 
foregoing communication to the involved party (A). The 
doctor/patient pair is a good example where this system can be 
utilized. In such a medical environment, there are many 
instances where previous communications are to be verified to 
identify the involved parties and the type of communications 
between parties. This way no party can deny his/her 
involvement, neither can deny the involved communication 
detail. For this, a digital signature is attached to the ongoing 
communication. This piece of evidence cannot be disputed 
later on by any of the involved people.  
Suite-B only specifies a set of cryptographic algorithms. 
The security protocol specifies the handshakes and exchange 
messages between end-points. The security protocol is not 
only capable of handling privacy, integrity, and non-
repudiation mechanisms involving the data exchange between 
two end-points, it is also responsible to enforce how often 
these mechanisms should be carried out, based on the 
minimum security requirements. In the application layer, 
which is the main layer under consideration, we are dealing 
with messages. These messages may contain simultaneous 
transmission of multimedia. To provide privacy, integrity, and 
non-repudiation, all messages are tagged and hashed, however 
not every individual message requires signing. This is due to 
the fact that the process of signing and verification is 
relatively complex and consumes high power and it has to be 
done as infrequent as possible. For this, a signature is applied 
to the hashed value of a message, instead of the message itself. 
Then the signed hash is encrypted and transmitted to the 
receiver, where it is verified. 
The application layer security protocol (similar to S/MIME) 
requires a key ex-change protocol and a certificate authority to 
provide key/certificate to both end-points. In a cipher block 
chaining mode, if a digital signature is used, it will be placed 
at the end of the last block. 
Suite-B cryptographic algorithms can be utilized in various 
layers, including the transport and network layers, which are 
discussed in the following sections.  
1) NSA Suite-B Cryptographic Algorithms 
A number of standards including IEEE P1363, ANSI 
X.9.62, X9.63, FIPS 186.2, specify aspects of Suite-B 
cryptographic algorithms. As mentioned, Suite-B is a 
collection of cryptographic algorithms, including; encryption, 
digital signature, key agreement, and message digest. NSA 
initiated cryptographic interoperability and security 
requirements issues, including Suite-B to protect both 
classified/unclassified information and national security 
systems and is the preferred security options for wireless 
applications. Suite B's algorithms utilize: 
-- Symmetric Encryption: AES 128 or 256 key sizes. For 
authenticated encryption purpose, AES should be used with 
GCM (Galois/Counter Mode), which is a 128-bit block cipher. 
-- Digital Signatures: This is achieved using Elliptic Curve 
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). 
-- Key Agreement: This is achieved using Elliptic Curve 
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH). 
- Message Digest: This is done using Secure Hash 
Algorithm (SHA-256, 384, and 512). 
 ECDH: The Suite-B key exchange agreement is based on 
ECDH, which uses elliptic curve-based Diffie-Hellman key 
agreement scheme. The ECDH protocol al-lows the two 
parties to establish a shared secret key over an insecure 
channel if they have an elliptic curve public-private key pair. 
This shared secret may be used directly or indirectly as a key. 
The ECDH scheme does not prevent man-in-the-middle attack 
because ECDH scheme on its own does not authenticate any 
of the two parties. For this, an authenticated Diffie-Hellman 
key agreement protocol is required, which is usually achieved 
by two parties authenticating themselves to each other by the 
use of public-key certificates or digital signatures (signed 
Diffie-Hellman). Through the signed-ECDH adoption, ECDH 
handshake flows are signed and verified using ECDSA. 
However this scheme is wasteful of bandwidth. To overcome 
this issue, a session key is required, which can be derived 
using a static public key to obtain implicit authentication of 
the resulting session key, which is the approach used in the 
MQV (Menezes-Qu-Vanstone) protocol [5]. In this protocol, 
the assumption is that both parties have long-term static 
public/private keys. A modified version of the MQV protocol 
is based on the Elliptic Curve, resulting ECMQV. Both MQV 
and ECMQV feature an authenticated protocol for key 
agreement based on Diffie Hellman scheme, providing 
protection against the man-in-the-middle attack. Here is the 
protocol handshake flow [6, 7]: 
1. A has a key pair (Pua,Pra), where Pua, is A’s public key 
and Pra is A’s private key. 
2. Similarly B has a key pair of (Pub,Prb). 
3. A generates a session key pair (X, x) by calculating 
X=x*P, where x is a random integer and P is a point on 
the Elliptic Curve. 
4. B follows the same calculation as was performed in 3 and 
calculates Y=y*P. 
5. A transmits X to B and B transmits Y to A. It is assumed 
that A already has B’s public key Pub and B already has 
A’s public key Pua.  
6. A calculates Sa (known as the implicit signature) by 
calculating; SaPua =(x + x' Pra) mod m, where m is the 
generating point P’s order. 
7. B calculates SbPub=(y+ y Prb) 
8. Now both A and B have calculated a shared secret key; Sk. 
9. Sk = CF * SPua (Y + y' SPub) = CF * SPub (X + x' Pua), 
where CF is a co-factor and x' and y' respectively 
represent the first L bits of the first X and Y pair 
component and where L = (logm 2 + 1)/2 
The problem with the deployment of ECMQV is that it is 
not part of Suite-B, therefore since the approach adopted in 
this article is based on Suite-B, therefore ECMQV is not used. 
For this we assume both parties have authenticated them-
selves to each other using public-key certificates. 
In this section, we will discuss the key establishment 
protocol (based on ECDH mechanism) further more:  
Key establishment protocol – Assuming Alice wishes to 
establish a shared key communication with Bob in a channel 
prone to third party eavesdropping. The initial domain 
parameters (p, a, b, G, n, h), which are defined as: p = a prime 
number, a and b = elliptic curve constants, G and n = G is a 
generator with an order that is the smallest non-negative 
number n such that nG = O, must be prime. Finally h is |E|/n, 
where n is the size of a subgroup of E. These domain 
parameters must be agreed upon. Each party must also have a 
key pair suitable for elliptic curve cryptography, comprised of 
a private key d (which is selected as a random integer from the 
interval [1,n − 1]) and a public key Q (where Q = dG). If 
trusted or provided via a certificate, public keys will be static.  
Assuming Alice has a key pair of (dA,QA) and Bob has a key 
pair of  (dB,QB). Before any data can be exchanged between 
these the two parties, each of them requires having the other 
side’s public key, therefore key exchange must occur. Then 
Alice calculates (xk,yk) = dAQB and Bob calculates k = dBQA. 
Assuming x and y are coordinates of a point, then the shared 
key is xk and the number computed by Alice and Bob will be 
equal since: dBdAG = dBQA = dAQB = dAdBG. 
Since solving the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm 
Problem for a third party without knowing the private key is a 
very difficult computational task with the current 
computational power, therefore the protocol is secure. 
Formal security analysis and proof for the security strength 
of Diffie-Hellman (DH) and DH-based protocols have been 
studied extensively in the literature. This can be generalized to 
ECDH, which is also based on DH.  
2) AES-GCM versus AES-CCM 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with either 128 or 
256 bits key size is used for the encryption in Suite-B 
cryptographic algorithms, mixed with the Galois-Counter 
Mode (GCM) block cipher mode for the authentication 
purpose. The AES-GCM algorithm is an extension of the 
AES-CCM (Counter with CBC-MAC), which used a 128-bit 
block cipher authentication scheme. AES-CCM has four 
inputs [8]: a nonce, an AES key, a plaintext, and an optional 
Additional Authenticated Data (AAD), generating two 
outputs; a Message Authentication Code (MAC), (also known 
as the Authentication Tag or “AT”) and a ciphertext.  
The AES-GCM is a 128-bit generic authenticated 
encryption block cipher mode. AES-GCM also has four inputs 
[8]: an initialization vector (IV), an AES key, a plaintext 
content, and optional AAD field, generating two outputs: a 
MAC (AT) and a ciphertext. 
Both of these schemes are very similar as they both perform 
authenticated encryption and accept AAD, however the GCM 
algorithm includes an authenticated encryption with one pass 
over the data, which allows a much higher throughput 
compared to that of CCM, which requires two passes.  
The proof of security for AES-GCM has been studied in 
literature [8]. AES is resistant against linear and differential 
cryptanalysis and when combined with GCM, the theorems 
provide proof of security. Reference [8] contains a 
combination of Lemmas and Theorems, indicating the security 
strengths of AES-GCM and GCM algorithms. 
 
 3) Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) 
Another Suite-B component is the ECDSA scheme, which 
uses Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in the structure of the 
digital signature analogous to DSA. With equal cryptographic 
power, ECC-based keys can be smaller than RSA-based keys. 
For example an ECC-based scheme with 224 bit key size is 
cryptographically comparable to both RSA and DSA with 
2048 bit key sizes. ECC-based scheme with 256 bit key size is 
comparable to RSA- and DSA-3072. However it has been 
shown in reference [9] that ECC-based scheme with 224 bits 
key operates more efficiently compared to their the RSA-2048 
and DSA-2048 equivalent schemes, which makes it a better fit 
for wireless applications [9]. The signature sizes for ECDSA-
160, ECDSA-224, and ECDSA-256, are 320, 448, and 512 
bits respectively, in which the first three correspond to 
signature sizes of RSA- and DSA-1024, 2048, and 3072 
requiring 1024, 2048, and 3072 bits respectively. These 
comparisons show how the ECDSA scheme outperforms RSA 
and DSA schemes from overhead point of view. Therefore 
ECDSA-256 is used in this article. 
Reference [9] indicates the security strength of ECDSA as 
the best known algorithm. 
4) Secure Hash Algorithms 
The Suite-B hash algorithm is based on either SHA-256, 
SHA-384 or SHA-512 algorithm. Secure Hash Algorithm is 
part of the Federal Information Processing Standards 
Publication 180-2 (FIPS 180-2) [3].  
5) Cross Layer Security 
In this scheme, a number of security-related parameters are 
gathered from various layers, accompanied with other 
gathered QoS-related parameters, which are all used in the 
design and integration of an application layer security-based 
module. The following security parameters are gathered: 
-- IPSec/VPN capability: The availability of IPSec and VPN 
tunneling is an important factor in the system’s security 
portfolio. To present all variations in the encryption schemes 
and operational modes (e.g., AH, ESP, AES, 3DES, etc.), 
which includes Suite-B IPSec algorithms, 8 bits are used. 
-- MAC layer security options: MAC layer security is a 
readily available security mechanism built in most wireless 
access technologies (e.g., WEP, WPA, WPA 2, etc.). To show 
the availability of the MAC layer security (e.g., scheme type, 
number of keys, etc.), 8 bits are used.  
6) Cross Layer-based Encryption/FEC Mechanism 
This scheme uses AES-128 bit – Galois-Counter Mode 
(AES-GCM) at the application layer with an adaptive Reed-
Solomon code. AES-GCM provides encryption and message 
authentication mechanisms.  
B. Security Protocol 
A security protocol is the handshake and protocol flow 
between two and more end-points, establishing a connection, 
securely exchanging key-information in an unsecure channel, 
authenticating each other (mutual authentication), and 
transmitting the information. The security protocol also 
defines other aspects of the communication, such as: How 
often the security algorithms are to be deployed and if they are 
applied to a stream of data or a block of data. The detail of the 
security protocol will be discussed in a later section. The other 
security subsystem is the security algorithms, based on Suite-
B, which will be discussed in the following subsection. 
The key exchange protocol (based on ECDH) was 
introduced. It was also discussed that ECDH is prone to man-
in-the-middle attack, therefore an authenticated Diffie-
Hellman key agreement protocol is required, For this we 
assume both parties have authenticated themselves to each 
other using public-key certificates. 
  Once the key is exchanged, A and B are able to transmit 
information to one another. Assume A is transmitting to B. As 
mentioned, at the application layer, we are dealing with 
messages and depending on the application in use and the 
level of the security of the transmitted information, a digital 
signature is applied to the ongoing traffic. 
In regards to the frequency of digital signature deployment, 
ECDSA is able to sign messages as large as 264 byte in 
length, therefore to conserve battery power, the security 
protocol is set to sign a group of blocks instead of signing 
each block of data. The number of blocks used for one 
signature depends on the context of the multimedia data. If 
high critical data are being transmitted and the validity of the 
sender/data needs to be checked, the frequency of the digital 
signature deployment can be relatively higher, such as every 
minute or every 10 minutes once. On the other side if a low 
critical data is being transmitted, a digital signature can be 
deployed less frequently, such as once a day. 
In a bursty type of data transmission, there are periods of 
time that no data is being transmitted. To maintain data 
freshness each transmitted block of data should be 
accompanied by an encrypted time-stamp coupled to a 
sequence number and the actual time of all entities in the 
network should be synchronized. The sequence number is 
used to track every transmitted block of multimedia data. 
In an extreme case, a signature can also be used for each 
packet, in which case a more accurate delay/overhead 
calculation is required. It should be noted that both AES-GCM 
 
Fig. 1.  Application layer security protocol handshakes. 
 and ARS schemes operate in block-based algorithms, 16 and 
256 bytes respectively.  
Figure 1 focuses on the security protocol interactions 
between party A and party B. The protocol starts with both 
parties (A and B) authenticating themselves to each other, 
using public key certificates. Once authenticated, ECDH 
handshakes will start. Following the authenticated key 
exchange, adaptive FEC schemes is performed. Then a digital 
signature will be applied to the block of data, then encryption 
and a second hash function is applied to the data until the 
final code-word is transmitted and termination request is sent 
and accepted. 
The application-layer provisioning Suite-B algorithms 
provide:  
Authentication: This is provided for parties A and B 
through the usage of public and private keys and for the 
multimedia data through the deployment of GCM algorithm 
Privacy: Privacy is provided through the deployment of 
AES algorithm. Following the cross-layer adaptive treatment 
of multimedia data, AES is applied to provide a strong 
encryption mechanism. 
Adaptive encoding: The authenticated and encrypted 
multimedia data and the QoS/security cross-layer information 
are used as inputs to the adaptive FEC scheme.   
Non-Repudiation: Non-repudiation is provided through the 
deployment of the digital signature algorithm; ECDSA. 
ECDSA is applied to the output of the adaptive FEC code 
words. The deployment of ECDSA at the application layer 
provides a non-repudiation service for messages containing 
multiple blocks of data with a time-limit that is being imposed 
by the criticality of the data. For a very critical data, a 
signature can be applied to 1 to 10 minutes of data blocks. For 
a non-critical data, a digital signature can be used for 1 entire 
day worth of data blocks. 
Integrity: Integrity is provided through the deployment of 
SHA-256, -384, and 512. The output of the adaptive FEC code 
words, the ECDSA digital signature, and the QoS-Security 
cross-layer information are all used as the SHA algorithm 
inputs 
IV. SECURITY MODEL AT THE TRANSPORT LAYER 
Transport-layer Suite-B algorithms deployment involves 
treating sessions instead of messages. AES-GCM provides 
data integrity and encryption for session flows. ECDSA is 
used in TLS, however applies only for authentication 
handshake and public keys, not for session flows.  
 The IP source and destination addresses are not protected 
in this method. As mentioned, we are dealing with sessions at 
this layer. A session is an ongoing transmission of data 
between two ports on both the sender and receiver devices. 
Therefore since ECDSA is used in the session handshake, 
therefore as long as the session is active, one digital signature 
is sufficient.  
Suite B implementations of TLS has been mentioned in 
RFC 5246 [10] and RFC 6460 [11]. For the 128-bit security 
level, the TLS-Suite-B scheme offers 
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256. 
During the TLS handshake protocol, Suite B algorithms utilize 
the form of key-agreement based on ECDHE_ECDSA (using 
the P-256 Elliptic Curve). This is the Ephemeral Unified 
Model key-agreement scheme where the server authenticates 
its part through the deployment of an ECDSA signature. The 
server must supply an X.509v3 certificate to the client, which 
contains an acceptable (accepted by the client) ECDSA key 
that will be used to verify its signature. That certificate must 
be signed using ECDSA by a CA. Figure 2 shows the protocol 
handshake flows between Ports A and B. Based on the 
certificates and the ECDSA signature, Ports A and B 
authenticate each other and the data flow starts 
(AES_128_GCM_SHA256) and continues until the 
termination REQ/ACK are transmitted. Optional functions are 
marked with “*”. 
The same process repeats for the client, which is required be 
authenticated during the TLS handshake (mutual 
authentication), then it must possess an X.509v3 certificate 
containing an acceptable (accepted by the server) ECDSA key, 
signed using ECDSA by a CA. The client authentication is 
initiated by the issuance of “ECDSA_sign” certificate request 
message, which is issued by the server, requesting the client 
for an appropriate ECDSA certificate. 
In terms of overhead, the digital signature is the costliest 
algorithm in Suite-B and for TLS, one digital signature is 
required per active session. The duration of a session depends 
on various parameters, including: Link quality and session 
cease/start triggered by the application. For the application-
layer security protocol, as mentioned, a critical application 
may require a digital signature every minute. For the same 
application running, the protocol for the transport-layer 
security is still dependent on the ongoing session. As long as 
the session is valid, one digital signature is sufficient. A 
session traffic analysis is required to find the average time of a 
session, which may be more than 1 minute (assuming a good 
link quality). Therefore for critical applications, the overhead 
 
Fig. 2.  Transport layer security protocol handshakes. 
 for the Suite-B TLS deployment may be less than the 
application-layer Suite-B deployment. However for non-
critical applications, the sessions may be terminated and 
reestablished multiple times per day, therefore a digital 
signature may be required more than once a day, which 
increases the overhead for the Suite-B TLS deployment 
compared to the application-layer Suite-B deployment. 
V. SECURITY MODEL AT THE NETWORK LAYER 
Before an IPSec tunnel is established and data is transmitted 
through the VPN tunnel, the two parties at the two end of the 
tunnel (VPN client and server) should authenticate each other 
and exchange ephemeral ECDH keys. This is considered in 
the Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol, specified in RFC 
5996 [12]. IKE performs mutual authentication among two 
parties, by which an IKE security association (SA) is 
established, which includes shared secret information used to 
establish SAs for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). A set 
of cryptographic algorithms, including Suite-B algorithms 
may also be set up. IKEv2 specifies the following services for 
the ESP mode: 
Encryption: This is done by AES with 128-bit keys in CBC 
mode (AES-CBC-128). 
Data Authentication and Integrity: IKEv2 uses the Pseudo-
Random Function (PRF) for generating keying material for 
authentication of the IKE SA and integrity. This is done 
through the deployment of HMAC-SHA-256 and HMAC-
SHA-256-128. 
Authentication: IKEv2 Elliptic Curve authentication is 
based on ECDSA-256. 
Figure 3 shows the IKEv3 protocol handshake flows. 
The deployment of Suite-B algorithms at the IP layer 
provides various security services (RFC 6379 [13]). For 
instance ECDH-ECDSA is used in the authentication 
handshake however does not provide non-repudiation services 
for the tunnel traffic.  
In terms of overhead, since the digital signature is the 
costliest algorithm in Suite-B and since for IPSec, one digital 
signature is required once per active tunnel and the duration of 
an active tunnel depends on various parameters, including link 
quality. For the application-layer security protocol, as 
mentioned, a critical application may require a digital 
signature every minute. For the same application running, the 
protocol for the network will require only one digital signature 
is sufficient. A tunnel traffic analysis is required to find the 
average time of a tunnel connection, which is expected to be 
more than 1 minute (assuming a good link quality) and it is 
also expected to be more than the session duration at the 
transport layer. Therefore for critical applications, the 
overhead for the Suite-B IPSec deployment may be less than 
both the application-layer and transport layer Suite-B 
deployments. For non-critical applications, the tunnel may be 
terminated and reestablished multiple times per day, however 
it is expected to last longer than a session, thus a digital 
signature may be required more than once a day. Therefore the 
overhead associated to the IPSec Suite-B deployment is 
expected to be more than the deployment of Suite-B at the 
application layer and less than the Suite-B deployment at the 
transport layer. 
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
This section is concerned with the security strength of this 
system based on the security strength of the involved 
algorithms.  
The security mechanisms used in this article are based on 
Suite-B cryptographic algorithms. Numerous references 
provide formal security analysis and proof for the security 
strengths of the Suite-B algorithms, which are considered 
secure based on today’s computational power. These are 
explained below [14]:  
Key-Size: The 128-bit key size when used with a strong 
encryption algorithm, such as AES, coupled with a message 
authentication technique, provided by the Galois-Counter 
Mode (AES-GCM), offers a very strong security algorithm 
based on today’s computational power and is expected to 
remain unbreakable until 2030. The 256-bit key size is used in 
the operation of ECDSA-256, which provides a strong digital 
signature algorithm. The AES-GCM and ECDSA are two of 
algorithms used in Suite-B. 
Key Exchange: The ECDH scheme is based on Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography (ECC) and Diffie-Hellman (D-H) 
algorithm. Based on today’s computational power, Diffie-
Hellman is secure against eavesdropping (passive attack), 
however without a strong mutual authentication mechanism, 
Diffie-Hellman is insecure against Man-in-the-Middle attack 
(active attack). Therefore the ECDH algorithm is considered 
secure based on today’s computational power.  
Digital Signature Security Analysis: The digital signature 
scheme used in this article is based on ECDSA-256, which is 
cryptographically comparable to RSA-3072 and DSA-3072. 
ECDSA is based on the DSA algorithm and despite the lack of 
a complete security proof, extensive attempts at cryptanalysis 
on either DSA or ECDSA have yet not yield any success. 
Therefore ECDSA is secure against forgery by adaptive 
chosen-message attack if the hash function is collision 
resistant and the elliptic curve group is modeled by a generic 
group. 
 
Fig. 3.  Network layer security protocol handshakes. 
 Hash Function Security Analysis: Though SHA-256, SHA-
384, and SHA-512 are not considered collision resistant 
functions, however they have still not been broken yet and are 
considered computationally secure with today’s computational 
power.  
IPSec Security Analysis: As mentioned, IPSec can be used 
in two flavors; Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and 
Authentication Header (AH). ESP protocol is the preferred 
choice as it provides authentication, confidentiality, and 
integrity. The ESP security strength is based on the security 
strength of AES, which is considered secure. 
A. Possible Attacks on the Suite-B Algorithms 
The possible attacks on the Suite-B algorithms are directly 
related to the security model and may include the followings: 
Dictionary-, brute-force-, birthday-, replay-, Man-in-the-
Middle-, forged-certificate-, IP-fragmentation-, ping-of-death-, 
UDP-session-hijacking-, traffic-analysis, and other types of 
attacks. The security strengths of the security algorithms 
deployed by this system help withstand the combination of the 
mentioned attacks. These will be discussed in the following 
contexts: 
Attack on the Suite-B algorithms: Suite-B algorithms used in 
this article, which are: ECDSA-256, AES (128)-GCM, and 
SHA-(256, 384, and 512), are all considered to be 
computationally secure. The digital signature (ECDSA) is 
based on the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and one of 
the known classical attacks on the ECC algorithms is based on 
an exponential-search-algorithm with a complexity of  , which 
represents the square-root attack. The largest ECC-based 
cryptographic algorithm, which has publicly been broken, is 
the 109-bit ECC algorithm. Therefore a scheme with 256-bit 
key-size is still considered secure [14]. 
Attacks on the Digital Signature Algorithm: Though there 
are numerous attacks applicable to ECDSA, including 
birthday and brute-force attacks. However, as mentioned in 
this section, ECDSA-256 is considered unbreakable [14].  
Attacks on the Hash Algorithm: All hash algorithms are 
subject to birthday attacks, which include all versions of SHA 
family. SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 have still not been 
broken yet and are considered computationally secure with 
today’s computational power [14]. 
AES used in IPSec: IPSec uses AES encryption algorithm. 
AES-128 is expected to remain secure till 2030 [14], however 
the method of attacking it is again through brute-force and 
birthday attacks. 
Many possible attacks on Suite-B algorithms have been 
discussed and considered in the design on Suite-E, which is 
introduced in the next subsection. 
 
A.1 Suite-E 
When Suite-B was introduced in 2005, mobile computing 
was still in the infancy of deployment and there were limited 
operational Wi-Fi/cellular-data-ready wireless handhelds 
available. Therefore Suite-B was used to securely cover larger 
systems and applications. By the end of 2000 as the number of 
data-ready handheld and smartphone devices skyrocketed, the 
need for a modified version of Suite-B suitable for handheld 
and embedded systems was felt. The introduced modified 
version of Suite-B (Suite-E) is suitable for handheld devices 
running Wireless Personal and Body Area Networks (WPAN 
and WBAN), where low power consumption is needed [6, 7]. 
The proposed cryptographic algorithms for Suite-E includes 
[k]: AES-CGM and AES-CCM, ECC over binary field, 
ECPVS (Elliptic Curve Pinstov Vanstone Signatures) 
bandwidth saving over ECDSA, ECQV certificates, ECMQV 
(Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone) key agreement, and 
SHA2/AES-MMO (Matyas-Meyer- Oseas). The differential 
components of Suite-E compared to Suite-B are introduced 
below [7]: 
ECQV – This is an implicit certificate, an ECC variant of 
certified public keys, which is standardized (ANSI NWI 
ballot, SECG SEC 4, and ISA SP100.11). ECQV features a 
much smaller certificate sizes, low computational complexity, 
and a very fast key generation algorithm.  
ECMQV – This is a key agreement protocol, variant 
(authenticated version) of Diffie-Hellman scheme and has 
been standardized (ANSI X9.63, IEEE 1363, SECG SEC 1, 
and ISA SP100.11). It is ZigBee Smart Energy 1.0 ready. The 
benefits of deploying ECMQV include: low computational 
complexity and bandwidth usage reduction. 
ECPVS – This is a digital signature scheme offering partial 
message recovery, which has also been standardized (ANSI 
X9.92, IEEE 1363a-2004, and SECG SEC 3). 
AES-MMO – This encryption scheme uses the Matyas-
Meyer- Oseas single-block-length one-way compression 
function, where the previous hash value is fed as the key to the 
block cipher. 
 
B. Possible Attacks on the Security Protocols 
The strength of the security protocol is required to be high 
enough to counter any possible attacks. Including: 
Man-in-the-Middle-Attack (MitMA): MitMA is when an 
adversary is located between legitimate parties; A and B and is 
able to intercept the communication. The ECDH key-
exchange algorithm is prone to MiTMA and to combat this 
security weakness, a mutual authentication scheme is required. 
An alternative scheme is to deploy ECMQV, which is part of 
Suite-E. This is based on the parties preexisting static public 
keys. Once keys are safely exchanged, the ongoing 
communication will be encrypted for privacy, which limits the 
ability of the adversary. 
Forged Certificate: Through ARP poisoning, the 
illegitimate party; C can pose as B and direct the initial 
communication from A. Then C can reply to A by forging B’s 
certificate. The deployment of a trusted Certificate Authority 
(CA) solves this problem. 
UDP Session Hijack: Due to the fact that UDP does not 
deploy synchronizing and packet sequencing, it may be prone 
to session hijack. The adversary is simply required to forge a 
server reply to a UDP client request before the actual server 
responds. The deployment of TLS will however prevent such 
a security threat through the built-in session security of TLS. 
Data Block Injection or Data Block Deletion: As the 
transmitted data may become non-streaming type, the flow of 
the information could encounter frequent breaks and sudden 
bursts. In order to provide data freshness and avoid any 
malicious activities, which may lead to deliberate deletion of 
 information, an encrypted synchronized time-stamp coupled to 
a sequence number should be accompanied with every 
transmitted block of data. This way the receiver is able to put 
together different blocks and execute various checks to ensure 
data has not been altered by any illegitimate party.  
Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack: DoS attack in a multilayer 
attack and could involve a continual transmission of queries 
targeting a specific application, session, port, MAC or IP 
address. At the application layer, any attempt to hamper the 
function of the protocol will result in a DoS attack. For 
example an adversary could target B and send many forged 
queries masquerading A. If each query is transmitted along 
with the digital signature of the sender, then the receiver can 
filter out the queries with digital signatures of any illegitimate 
parties. At transport and network layers, the same issue may 
take place and again the receiver (port/party) can filter-out 
queries with unidentifiable senders. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this article, a state-of-the-art, novel approach to 
application, transport, and network layer security has been 
considered through multilayer Suite-B provisioning. The 
deployed cryptographic algorithms are based on Suite-B and 
the key agreement algorithm offered by Suite-B is Elliptic 
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) scheme. Following the key 
agreement algorithm, traffic flows between Party A and Party 
B will include several Suite-B security parameters, which 
including: AES-128 for encryption, AES-GCM 
(Galois/Counter Mode) for authentication and encryption, 
which is a 128-bit block cipher. ECDSA-256 offers digital 
signature functionality, and SHA-512, offers a hashing 
mechanism.  
Non repudiation service is provided through the deployment 
of ECDSA and a number of protocols and algorithms have 
been discussed through applying the National Security Agency 
(NSA)’s Suite B algorithms at application, transport, and 
network layers. The related algorithms and security protocols 
have been discussed in detail in this article.  
The introduction of Suit-B happened in 2005 when mobile 
computing was at its infancy. A modified version of Suite-B 
(Suite-E) was later introduced (end of 2000), which is more 
suitable for handheld and embedded systems, which has also 
been discussed in this article. 
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